

# On the Effects of Regulated Overtime Standards

An examination of California's new overtime law for agricultural workers

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# The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938



Since 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has been one of main U.S. laws aimed at protecting employees.

It sets federal standards for several terms of employment, including:

- Minimum wage
- Child labor
- Overtime

# Two Key Aspects of the FLSA Overtime Provisions

## FLSA Fact #1

The act exempts some workers and industries from some or all of its standards

⇒ farm workers and ag employers are among the exempt

⇒ not legally entitled to any overtime pay, some (smaller) employers are not required to pay the minimum wage, and child labor laws are less stringent.

## FLSA Fact #2

The act requires employers to comply with state laws that provide “greater employee protections.”

⇒ common in the context of minimum wages

⇒ becoming more common in the context of overtime

# Farmworker overtime states

**Washington's** new overtime law took effect Jan. 1, setting an overtime threshold of 55 hours per week. It phases down to 48 hours in 2023 and 40 in 2024.

*Federal law exempts farm laborers from overtime wage requirements, but the following states have passed or proposed laws to make farmworkers eligible to varying degrees.*

**New York** in 2020 set a 60-hour threshold for agricultural overtime. A three-member wage board meets late each year to set the threshold for the upcoming year. They left the level at 60 hours in 2021. They had not convened yet for 2022 at press time.

In 2021, **Maine** lawmakers proposed a bill that would have mandated farmworker overtime. It failed.

In 2021, **Oregon** lawmakers proposed a bill that would have phased in farmworker overtime over three years and allocate \$100 million to help farmers pay for the transition. It failed.

**Minnesota** sets an overtime threshold at 48 hours per week but exempts relatively well-paid salaried farmworkers.

**Maryland** started a 60-hour overtime threshold in 2019, with exceptions for piece-rate fruit harvesters working 13 weeks or less and employees at small farms.

In 2017, **California** began gradually lowering overtime thresholds for farmworkers, hitting 40 hours per week and eight hours per day this year. Small farms have extra time to comply.

**Colorado** will start a 60-hour threshold for farmworker overtime in November 2022. In 2024, that drops to 56 hours per week for small farms and 48 hours per week for larger farms, with a 22-week peak season exception up to 56 hours.

**Hawaii** law sets the overtime threshold at 40 hours but allows farms to pick 20 weeks of peak labor need to use a 48-hour limit. Small farms have other exceptions.

ROSS COURTNEY AND JARED JOHNSON/  
GOOD FRUIT GROWER

**This Study: How do regulated overtime standards (in California ag) impact the workers they aim to protect (in the short-run)?**

## Context: California's Assembly Bill 1066 Overtime Phase-in

Effective Date for Employers with...		Overtime Pay Required After
> 25 Employees	≤ 25 Employees	(Hours per Day/Hours per Week)
Pre 2019	Pre 2022	10/60
Jan. 1 2019	Jan. 1 2022	9.5/55
Jan. 1 2020	Jan. 1 2023	9/50
Jan. 1 2021	Jan. 1 2024	8.5/45
Jan. 1 2022	Jan. 1 2025	8/40

**Notes:** Table adapted from the California Labor Commissioner's Office FAQs on Minimum Wage [https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq\\_minimumwage.htm](https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage.htm) and Overtime for Agricultural Workers <https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Overtime-for-Agricultural-Workers.html>.

# Why Study Overtime? No Consensus in Economic Theory

**The “Motivating” Prediction:** reduced hours + more workers =  $\uparrow$  welfare

- Supported by **hours-demand models** assuming that firms will reduce hours to the “kink” in the cost curve (Brechling, 1965; Ehrenberg, 1971; Hart, 2004; Rosen, 1968)

## Several Alternatives:

- **Hours-demand models** also show how hours can increase or remain the same, depending on firm type (Brechling, 1965; Ehrenberg, 1971; Hart, 2004; Rosen, 1968)
- **Wage-hours compensating models** suggest no hours (or earnings) effects, with reductions in base wages (Filer et al. 1996; Hart 2004; Trejo 1991)
- Ambiguous effects dependent on substitutionability or complementarity between inputs (Calmfors and Hoel, 1989; Ehrenberg and Schumann, 1982) or unexpected shocks (ao Madeira, 2014; Ehrenberg, 1970)

## Why Study Overtime? No Consensus in Econometric Studies

**Hours** *decrease* (Buchmueller and Senesky, 2003; Chemin and Wasmer, 2009; Costa, 2000; Hamermesh and Trejo, 2000; Kuroda and Yamamoto, 2012; Skuterud, 2007) or *remain the same* (Johnson, 2003; Trejo, 2003)

**Wages** *increase* (Raposo and van Ours, 2010; Sánchez, 2017) *decrease* (Raposo and van Ours, 2010; Sánchez, 2017), or *remain the same* (Chemin and Wasmer, 2009; Kawaguchi et al., 2017)

**Earnings** *decrease* (Chen and Wang, 2011; Raposo and van Ours, 2010) or *remain the same* (Kawaguchi et al., 2017; Kuroda and Yamamoto, 2012)

**Employment** *remains the same* (Brown and Hamermesh, 2019; Chemin and Wasmer, 2009; Sánchez, 2017)

**Bunching** at overtime thresholds *increases* (Quach, 2022)

# This Study: Questions, Results Preview, and Contributions

## Whether: What happens to work hours?

- ⇒ **Average hours decrease** by 4 hours per week
- ⇒ **Hours distribution shifts**, more workers with hours below thresholds

## How: What outcomes are impacted?

- ⇒ **Average earnings decrease** by \$65 per week; fewer high earners
- ⇒ (prelim) No change in overall employment, but H-2A employment increases
- ⇒ (prelim) Reductions in workplace injuries

## Contributions:

1. First empirical analysis of reductions in weekly overtime thresholds in the U.S.
2. First distributional analysis of overtime regulations
3. Heterogeneity and policy implications tailored to U.S. agriculture

## Data: The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS)

The NAWS is the only nationally representative survey of US agricultural workers.

Includes information from 1,200-3,600 interviews with workers at their place of work each cycle (two fiscal years). Currently available through 2022. Large share (1/3) of interviews are in California.

Includes detailed information on **characteristics of current farm job:**

- Hourly wage, weekly hours, earnings last pay period, task, crop, and more

But, the NAWS has limitations:

- Does not have information on employer (size)
- Does not estimate total employment
- Does not include H-2A (Visa) Workers
- Small sample sizes

## **Methods & Results for Average Effects**

## Approach 1: Event Study / Regression Discontinuity in Time

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}'\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \sum_{t=2009}^{2022} \beta_t \mathbb{1}(\text{time} = t) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

## Approach 2: Dynamic DiD with and without controls

$$Y_{ist} = \mathbf{X}_{ist}'\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \sum_{t=2009}^{2022} \beta_t \mathbb{1}(\text{time} = t) \mathbb{1}(\text{state}=\text{CA}) + \gamma_s + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

**Controls:** age, education, gender, children, experience, legal status, task, crop

**Outcomes:** Weekly Hours, Weekly Earnings (2022 real \$)


## Identification: Dynamic DiD

**Identifying assumption:** Parallel trends—absent the OT law, the gap between treated and control groups would remain constant over time.


### Identification concerns:

1. Worker and job characteristics differ in CA and other states, and hours or earnings evolve differently across time for these characteristics. demographics jobs  
⇒ Alternative control groups and DR-DiD (Sant'Anna and Zhao, 2020)
2. Other policies that impact hours or earnings have evolved differently in CA and other states (minimum wages). minimum wages  
⇒ Currently using a first stage regression on min wage (suggestions encouraged)
3. Worker and job characteristics that impact hours or earnings have evolved differently in CA and other states. (not the case)

## On Average, Working Hours Decreased by 3-5 hrs/wk (4.2 in preferred)



# On Average, Earnings Fell by 40-100 \$/wk (\$65 in preferred)



## **Methods & Results for Distributional Effects**

**Approach 1: Dynamic DiD without controls**


**Approach 2: Dynamic DiD (non-ot states + controls + adj. earnings)**

**Approach 3: Distribution Regression DiD** (Chernozhukov et al., 2013; Dube, 2019)


$$\mathbb{1}[Y_{ist} \leq z] == \alpha + \sum_{t=-10}^4 \beta_{gt} D_{i,g,t} + \gamma_r + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$


where  $z$  is a threshold for hours or earnings


For hours, I repeat this in 5 hours increments from 30 to 60.




●  $\leq 30$







●  $\leq 30$  ●  $\leq 35$  ●  $\leq 40$  ●  $\leq 45$  ●  $\leq 50$



**Approach 1: Dynamic DiD without controls**

**Approach 2: Dynamic DiD with controls (ETWFE)**

**Approach 3: Distribution Regression DiD** (Chernozhukov et al., 2013; Dube, 2019)



$$\mathbb{1}[Y_{ist} \leq z] = \alpha + \sum_{t=-10}^4 \beta_{gt} D_{i,g,t} + \gamma_r + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

**Construct Counterfactual Distributions** (Chernozhukov et al., 2013)

⇒ I estimate the above equation using a logistic regression, subtracting the estimated DiD effect in each post-year and predict the probability that each worker's hours or earnings would fall below the indicated threshold (if the law never went into effect).

# California 2019 & 2020: Observed Vs. Predicted Hours



Factual and Counterfactual Proportions, 2020



# California 2021 & 2022: Observed Vs. Predicted Hours

Individual Years

Factual and Counterfactual Proportions, 2022



# Additional Specifications and Robustness

## Heterogeneity: Hours decreased more for...

- Documented workers versus Undocumented workers
- English speakers versus non-English speakers
- Piece rate paid workers (relative to hourly)

## Robustness

- Average hours effects are similar in the ACS [results](#)
- Distribution results consistent in event study design [results](#)
- No distributional changes in control states [results](#)
- No sig. changes when replicating for placebo treatment period [results](#)
- Increased bunching at the thresholds [results](#)

## Recap and Discussion

As implemented, California's new overtime legislation appears to have reduced weekly working hours and earnings for crop workers, while not creating more domestic jobs.

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### In 2021/22...

The average California crop employee **worked 4 fewer hours** and **earned \$65 less** each week than they would have without the overtime law in place.

⇒ How hours and earnings changed are consistent with employers cutting hours to avoid paying the higher overtime rates.

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As implemented, California's new overtime legislation appears to have reduced weekly working hours and earnings for crop workers, while not creating more domestic jobs.

### In 2021/22...

The average California crop employee **worked 4 fewer hours** and **earned \$65 less** each week than they would have without the overtime law in place.

⇒ How hours and earnings changed are consistent with employers cutting hours to avoid paying the higher overtime rates.

Only 28% of crop workers worked  $> 45$  hrs/week

⇒ 52% would have worked this without the law in place

Only 48% of workers earned  $> \$600$  a week

⇒ 68% would have earned this without the law in place

# Looking Forward: Policy Implications and Next Steps

## A subsidy or tax credit Policy Simulations

- ↑↑ Hours, ↑↑ Income
- Not feasible in California given the current deficit...

## Exploring Employer Adaptation: Results

- **Preliminary** Evidence of substituting for H-2A Visa Workers
- **Preliminary** Reduced worker injuries are more consistent with reduced hours than being overworked

## Missing Pieces and Next Steps:

- Multiple job holdings, worker well-being, preferences for hours versus income
- Implications for employers, agricultural production, technology

# Thank you!

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# Looking Forward: Policy Implications, Solutions, and a Caveat

## A subsidy or tax credit

- ↑↑ Hours, ↑↑ Income


## A partial reversal

- ↑ Hours, ↑ Income


## Important missing pieces in my work:

- Multiple job holdings, worker well-being, preferences for hours versus income
- Implications for employers, agricultural production, technology


# Evidence from the Raw Data: Change in Hours in Non-OT States

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# Evidence from the Raw Data: Change in Hours in Non-OT Nearby States

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## An Aside: Wage Compression Toward the Minimum Wage [Back](#)




## Baseline Differences in Worker Demographics) [back](#)

	California		All Non-OT States	
	mean	se	mean	se
Age	38.49	0.483	37.91	0.450
Education (years)	7.42***	0.124	7.42	0.124
Farm experience (years)	15.84***	0.417	13.57	0.377
Female (prop.)	0.27	0.026	0.30	0.015
Undocumented (prop.)	0.57***	0.020	0.41	0.019
Has kid (prop.)	0.51***	0.015	0.40	0.015
Speaks English (prop.)	0.24***	0.015	0.51	0.019
Observations (pre-period)	6,811		8,459	
Observations (full sample)	8,717		10,198	

# Baseline Differences in Job Attributes) [back](#)

	California		All Non-OT States	
	mean	se	mean	se
Task (prop.):				
Pre-harvest	0.28	0.023	0.32	0.019
Harvest	0.22*	0.027	0.17	0.014
Post-harvest	0.15***	0.026	0.24	0.016
Semi-skilled	0.34**	0.028	0.27	0.016
Supervisor	0.00	0.000	0.00	0.000
Crop type (prop.):				
Field crops	0.03***	0.005	0.18	0.017
Fruits & Nuts	0.57***	0.035	0.16	0.021
Horticulture	0.09***	0.019	0.36	0.021
Vegetables	0.30	0.033	0.26	0.018
Misc/Mult	0.01***	0.007	0.04	0.006
Pay type (prop.):				
Hourly	0.86	0.024	0.94	0.009
Piece Rate	0.11	0.020	0.05	0.009
Combination	0.03	0.014	0.01	0.002
Observations (pre-period)	6,811		8,459	
Observations (full period)	6,811		8,459	

# California Minimum Wages Increased More than Other States [Back](#)




# California Minimum Wages Increased More than Other States

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State	Pct. $\Delta$ in Min Wage
California	87.5
New Jersey	79.3
Massachusetts	78.1
Arizona	76.6
Colorado	73.2
Maryland	72.4
Maine	70.0
Connecticut	69.7
Rhode Island	65.5
Oregon	60.7
Vermont	55.7
Missouri	53.8
New Mexico	53.3
Virginia	51.7
Arkansas	51.7
Florida	51.7

**Notes:** Percentage change in state minimum wages from 2010 to 2022.

## An Aside: Wage Compression Toward the Minimum Wage [Back](#)



# Minimum Wage Increase Schedule


[Back](#)[Back to Equation](#)

Effective Date	Hourly Minimum Wage for Employers with...	
	>25 Employees	≤25 Employees
Jan. 1 2022	\$15.00	\$14.00
Jan. 1 2021	\$14.00	\$13.00
Jan. 1 2020	\$13.00	\$12.00
Jan. 1 2019	\$12.00	\$11.00
Jan. 1 2018	\$11.00	\$11.00
Jan. 1 2017	\$10.50	\$10.00
Jan. 1 2016	\$10.00	\$10.00
Jul. 1 2014	\$9.00	\$9.00
Jan. 1 2008	\$8.00	\$8.00


# Minimum Wage Increase Schedule [Back](#)

Effective Date	Hourly Minimum Wage for Employers with...	
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
# Improved DR DiD Results

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
# California Farmworker Hours Decreased After the Law





# ES Results: Hours Decrease for the Average Worker ( $Y_{it} = \ln(\text{hours}_{it})$ )

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



# DiD Results: Hours Decrease for the Average Worker ( $Y_{it} = \text{hours}_{it}$ )

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



# Results: Distributional Effects ( $Y_{it} = \mathbb{1}(\text{hours} \leq h)$ )

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# Robustness: DR-Event Study, California Only [Back](#)




# Robustness: DR-Event Study, All Non-OT States

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
**The NAWS (raw data):**

**What happens to hours, wages, and earnings for California  
Workers?**


# Evidence from the Raw Data: Hours Decrease

[Hours in Non-OT States](#)[Back](#)





# Evidence from the Raw Data: Earnings Stagnate, Decline







# Evidence from the Raw Data: Earnings Stagnate, Decline

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



# Robustness: DR-DiD 2015-2018 as “Treatment”

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

# Robustness: Bunching, California Only

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

# California 2019-2022: Observed Vs. Predicted Hours

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# Results: Increased Probability of Hours Below New OT Thresholds




# Results: Increased Probability of Hours Below New OT Thresholds

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
# DiD Results: Wages and Earnings Decrease for the Average Worker ( $Y_{it} = \text{hours}_{it}$ )

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## Hourly Wage



## Weekly Earnings




To create the figures demonstrating bunching in each year, I run a series of regressions of the form:

$$\mathbb{1}(h_{it} = h) = \mathbf{X}_{it}' \boldsymbol{\alpha}^h + \sum_{t=-10}^3 \beta_t^h \mathbb{1}(\text{time} = t) + \varepsilon_{it}^h \quad (5)$$

where  $h$  takes on all integer values from 30 to 65.

The bunching figures show all coefficients  $\beta^h$  for a given value of  $t$ , that is, the coefficient on the same year indicator in each separate regression.

## ES Results: Bunching in 2018 for Comparison

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## Direct Hire

	SDID, adj. emp.	SDID, emp.	SC, adj. emp.
ATT	-0.027 (0.138)	-5124.750*** (832.514)	-0.033 (0.209)
Observations	1,071	1,071	1,071

## Contract Hire

	SDID, adj. emp.	SDID, emp.	SC, adj. emp.
ATT	-0.102 (1.191)	-1476.198*** (542.958)	-0.145 (1.755)
Observations	693	693	693

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

All H-2A Workers, Since 2011

	SDID, adj. emp.	SC, adj. emp.	SDID, emp.	SC, emp.
ATT	2.504** (1.154)	2.916** (1.405)	8312.399*** (2753.127)	8458.448** (3846.949)

# 2022 Factual Versus Predicted Earnings for California Workers

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Factual and Counterfactual Proportions, 2022

