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**THE POWER OF UNOFFICIAL EXPECTATIONS: SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND LONG WORK HOURS IN CALIFORNIA***

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I. INTRODUCTION

The structure of work has dramatically changed over the past 25 years. The growing literature on the “new economy” workplace describes the increase in wage inequality, the growing reliance on temporary and contract employees, and the diminishment of job security (Osterman 1999, Smith 2001, Reich 2000). Less attention has been paid to the demise of the forty hour work week and the growing dispersion in work hours leading some workers to put in extremely long hours while others are not working enough. The existing literature on work hours has been absorbed in a debate about whether or not these changes amount to an overall increase in work hours. The debate about aggregate trends has overlooked the critical question of *who* is working longer hours and *why*? This paper begins to fill the gap in the literature by examining the causes behind long work hours. We claim that the changes in work hours are best understood as part of the same underlying transformation of the workplace that has occurred pursuant to the rise of the shareholder value conception of the corporation. This conception has replaced the dominant postwar “implicit labor contract” between the corporation and its various stakeholders with management strategies that focus on maximizing the financial value of the company’s stocks. As pertaining to work hours, we will show how the logic of shareholder value management can account for the elongation of work hours for certain types of workers who cannot be easily replaced with machines or temporary workers. We will also analyze how and why companies utilize indirect or “unofficial” management strategies to pressure certain of their employees to work long hours.

II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The standard forty hour work week is dead. There is a vigorous debate over whether aggregate work hours have increased over the past 30 years¹, but no dispute about the growing dispersion in work hours. The existing literature, however, is missing any systematic analysis of the reasons behind the increase in work hours among certain segments of the workforce. Jacobs and Gerson (1998) showed that long work hours are associated with certain occupational categories. This paper builds on Jacobs and Gerson's findings by looking behind generic occupational categories and exploring the characteristics of the workplaces where workers put in long work hours as well as the subjective motivations reported by workers who are putting in long work hours.

With the growing polarization in work hours our society is experiencing *both* overwork and underwork, with a simultaneous surge in the number of workers putting in fifty plus hours per week (Jacobs and Gerson, 1998), and a growing number of employees working irregular hours and wanting to work more. The existing literature has shown that the dispersion in work hours follows certain patterns. Men generally work more hours than women, but over the past 20 years women's work hours have increased

¹ In *The Overworked American*, Juliet Schor (1991) claimed that from 1969 to 1987 average annual American work hours increased by 163 hours. Supporting Schor, the International Labor Organization (1999) found that during the 1990s, average annual American work hours increased by 36 hours. Robert Reich's (2000) analysis of 1999 data from the U.S. Department of Labor's *Report on the American Workforce* provides further empirical support. Reich found that depending on the method of calculation, average annual work hours increased from 1979 to 1999 by either 71 hours or 142 hours. Using 1999 OECD data, Mishel et al (2001) found that American work hours increased by 61 hours from 1979 to 1998. Pointing in the other direction, Robinson and Godbey's (1997) time-diary study claims that free time actually increased from 1965 to 1985. Coleman and Pencavel's (1993) analysis also raises questions about the extent of the aggregate rise in work hours. [Is anyone disputing the rise of work hours in the 1990's?]. Finally, Hout and Hanley have recently tried to reconcile these conflicting findings by showing that at the level of the household work hours have unambiguously increased.

at a faster rate than men's (Mishel, 2001). To some extent the dispersion in work hours also follows occupational groupings, with managers and professionals putting in more hours than blue collar, service or other white collar workers. Fligstein and Shin (forthcoming) have recently shown that while 50% of managers and 35% of professionals work more than 40 hours a week, less than 30% of blue collar workers and other white collar workers work such hours. Rones, Ilg and Gardner (1997) show that managers and professionals are increasingly more likely than blue collar or service workers to work over 49 hours per week. Putting together these occupational and gender differences, Jacobs and Gerson found that among men, 35% of professional, managerial, and technical employees work more than 50 hours a week, while only 20% of men in other occupations work such hours. For women, 17% of professional, managerial, and technical employees work more than 50 hours per week, as compared to 7% for women in other occupations (Jacobs and Gerson 1998).

The fact that managers and professionals are working more hours than less economically privileged blue collar and service workers should once and for all lay to rest neoclassical economics' myth of the backward bending labor supply curve. Whereas neoclassical economists predicted that with an increase in the financial rewards of work employees would choose to decrease their work hours, the empirical literature shows that the opposite is in fact the case.

How can the long hours among the most privileged groups of workers be explained? Economists like Schor (1991) and Reich (2000) argue that long work hours are the result of economic incentives to increase consumption or to avoid the growing opportunity costs of not working long hours. Sociologists have challenged this view with

qualitative case studies that point to management strategies which achieve non-economic motivations. Arlie Hochschild's (1997) study of a large manufacturing company suggests that workers put in long hours because they are seduced by management's creation of a cozy home-like workplace which for many workers surpasses the pleasantness of the home. Ofer Sharone's (forthcoming) study of a large high tech firm suggests that long hours are the result of management strategies that foster worker insecurity and anxiety about their relative professional competence and status. While the economists' assumptions and the sociologists' case studies suggest plausible explanations for the rise in work hours, until now there has been no systematic survey study examining the causes of long work hours.

The gap in the existing literature is two fold. First, there is no systematic analysis of *why* managers, professionals and some other workers are working more hours. What is driving an increasing number of them to forgo leisure and stay at work? Second, there is no systematic examination of differences within groups who put in long hours. What factors help explain why some managers and professionals put in long hours and others do not? Is there anything that characterizes the workplaces of blue collar and service workers who, unlike most others in their occupation, put in long hours?

III. HYPOTHESES

Our exploration of these questions was motivated by the theory that the patterns in work hours are the result of the same fundamental shift to shareholder value conception of the corporation that is at the root of the other transformations in the structure of work. The shareholder value conception of the corporation was a response to the economic crises of slow growth and low corporate profits during the 1970s.

Corporate elites understood these crises to be the result of firms being bloated with too many workers, and workers having become lazy and complacent due to excessive protection from the discipline of the labor market (Fligstein, 2001). With this analysis, in the 1980s corporate executives adopted a new set of understandings about the meaning and function of a corporation. The focus of the corporation shifted from growth and size to profits and the value of the corporate stock in financial markets. With this new corporate orientation came a new relationship between the firm and its workers. The shareholder value management practices changed the firms' relation to its workers from long-term partners to costs that need to be minimized. The drive to minimize labor costs in turn led to the outsourcing of work to companies paying low wages, hiring temporary workers instead of new full time employees, and laying off workers. While at first layoffs mostly affected blue collar workers, eventually, managing for shareholder value lifted the taboo against laying off white collar workers (Osterman, 1999). In particular, the recession of the early 1990s made downsizing a reality for middle managers, professionals and other white collar workers (Fligstein & Shin, forthcoming). Smith's (1990) case study of "restructuring" at a large American bank provides a glimpse at the process that typified that period's policy of reducing the ranks of middle managers.

We theorize that the increasing work hours of managers, professionals and other workers is the result of these shareholder value management practices. While the work performed by laid off blue collar workers was usually replaced by automated production, temporary workers or offshore workers, the work of laid off white collar workers was supposed to be replaced through greater "efficiencies" attained by intensifying and elongating the work for those who remain. The exertion of pressure on remaining

workers to work harder and longer flowed from the executive's analysis of the "problem" of lazy workers. We suspect that "lean" firms made up their lost white collar labor by implementing management strategies that pressured workers to increase their work hours.

Because of the difficulties of totally replacing certain white collar workers, we suspect that employers followed a bifurcated management strategy for achieving the corporate goal of maximizing shareholder value. The labor costs for one group of workers, consisting mainly of blue collar workers, service workers and other white collar workers, are minimized by decreasing necessary full time worker hours through automation, sending the work offshore, and use of temporary and/or part time shift workers (who receive no benefits). The labor costs for the second group, mostly professionals and managers, are minimized by hiring less people and having them work longer hours. Since the functions of these workers often requires trained human discretion which cannot be automated or assigned to untrained temporary workers, for them work is instead intensified and elongated. This analysis suggests our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Workers in jobs requiring the exercise of discretion, specifically managers, professionals and other workers with supervisory authority, will put in longer hours than blue collar, service or other white collar workers.

We further hypothesize that the management strategies to generate longer work hours from managers, professionals or other valuable fulltime workers will operate by indirect means and will not explicitly long hours. Traditionally these high status salaried

jobs have not imposed rigid work schedules, or mechanisms like punch-in cards that are common for hourly workers. Any attempt to dictate a given number of work hours among managers or professional employees would likely be seen as an affront to their occupational status and professional autonomy. Faced with this constraint, we suspect that firms turn to informal or “unofficial” forms of pressures that are built in to the work process. For example, pressure to work long hours may be generated by the establishment of tight deadlines for the completion of projects. Unlike dictates about specific work hours, project deadlines - especially ones that emanate directly from customers as opposed to bosses- seem to respect the employees’ autonomy while generating pressure to put in long hours. We suspect another indirect strategy may be to simply have employees be more accessible to customers or colleagues at odd times through cell phones or beepers. Again, the employee is not required to work more, but is *available* to communicate about work 24/7, predictably leading to more time spent doing work. These management strategies do not impose explicit requirements, but do convey management’s unstated expectations regarding long work hours. This analysis suggests two further hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: Long work hours are associated with workplaces that are characterized by tight deadlines, a work pace set by customers, and use of cell phones and beepers.

Hypothesis 3: Workers putting in long hours will report that unofficial expectations, as opposed to any explicit requirements or other factors, are the most significant reason for their work hours.

Our data confirms these hypotheses. As we will show long work hours are most strongly associated with workplaces that create “unofficial expectations” which subtly pressure workers to put in long hours. Such expectations may be conveyed by the exposure to tight deadlines for projects which come directly from customers as opposed to superiors, or from the company “wiring” its workers to the workplace for 24/7 accessibility through cell phones and pagers. By contrast to the economists’ assumptions that long work hours are driven by financial concerns, or Hochschild’s case study focusing on employee enjoyment of their work and work environment, we will show that workers putting in long work hours tend to do so in response to managerial pressure.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

The 2001 California Workforce Survey was designed to assess the state of the California workforce. The survey collected data on California workers' attitudes toward a range of issues as well as on the status, conditions and practices of their employment. Interviews were conducted from September, 2001 until December 2001. The survey was sponsored by the Institute for Labor and Employment at the University of California, Berkeley. Unionized workers were oversampled in this survey to facilitate comparative analyses of unionized workers and non-unionized workers. Note that those not currently working were asked most of the attitudinal questions, but of course the questions about their current jobs were skipped.

There were two California samples for this study: a cross-section sample

and a union-member oversample. Both samples cover all telephone exchanges in the state of California. A total of 22 replicates were created to facilitate sample management -- 12 of the 22 replicates were allocated to the cross-section sample in which all adults in residential households were eligible, and the other 10 replicates were allocated to the union-member oversample in which only adult union members currently working full- or part-time were eligible.

Both samples of telephone numbers for this survey were generated using a procedure called list-assisted random-digit sampling. This method preserves the characteristics of a simple random sample but takes advantage of the availability of large computer databases of telephone directory information to make the sample more efficient. It allows us to reduce the number of unproductive calls to non-working telephone numbers and to obtain a higher proportion of households in our sample than we would achieve by simple random-digit dialing.

Briefly, the method works like this: all possible telephone numbers in the state of California are divided into two strata -- telephone numbers from series of 100 numbers with zero or one residential listing in the telephone directories, and telephone numbers from series with at least two such listings. The sample of telephone numbers used for this project was then generated with random numbers, in order to include unlisted numbers, from the stratum containing series of telephone numbers with at least two residential listings. The stratum containing series of telephone numbers with zero or one residential listing is unlikely to contain many residential numbers, and therefore was excluded from the sampling frame. For a detailed description of this sampling method, see Robert J. Casady and James M. Lepkowski, "Stratified Telephone Survey Designs,"

Survey Methodology, Vol. 19 (June 1993), pp. 103-113. This procedure resulted in the following sample. The survey had a response rate of 50.8% (1255 respondents out of 2471 households).

It is useful to compare some of the aggregate statistics in the survey with published statistics from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the 2000 Census in order to get an idea about how representative the sample is of California more generally. According to the 2000 Census, 73.1% of the California population was born in the U.S. In our sample, 69.3% were born in the U.S. The 2000 Census reports that whites represent 47.7%, blacks, 6.4%, Latino 32.4%, Asian 10.8%, and Native Americans .5%. In our survey, whites were 56.7%, blacks were 5.4%, Latinos, were 28.2%, Asian, 8.7%, and Native Americans were 1.5%. According to the CPS, the California unemployment rate in 2001 averaged 5.2%. In our survey, the unemployment rate was 5.3%. We note that unemployment was rising over the year and our survey was done in the last part of the year. The average education in California according to the 2000 Census was 13.4 years. In our sample it was 13.4 years as well. The 2000 Census reported that 59.6% of Californians had attended some college and in our sample 63.3% attended college.

The CPS reports that in 2001, unionized workers represented 16.4% of the employed population. In our sample union workers represented 17.7% of the employed population. The 2000 Census reports that 35.4% of Californians are managers or professionals. Our sample contains 34.0% managers/professionals. The 2000 Census also reports that 15.7% of Californians work for the government while 19.3% of the respondents in our survey work for the government. Our sample, thus, is less racially and ethnically mixed than the census, although it contains slightly more foreign born persons.

The sample has a similar educational mix to the census. It has people who are slightly more likely to be in unions. It also contains people who are less likely to be managers and professionals and more likely to be working for the government.

Our survey does not consistently appear to draw on higher or lower socioeconomic groups. But there are some differences between the sample and the datasets that reflect more accurately the whole population of California. The main discrepancy between our survey and other sources is that our survey draws on more whites. As with any sample, one always needs to be cautious in drawing inferences for the population. The main advantage of our survey is its wealth of information on work settings and working conditions. It is these results that are the focus of the rest of our discussion.

V. DISCUSSION OF DATA

Table 1 and Table 2, Model A, confirm the patterns that are well-documented in the literature regarding the considerable work hour differences across genders and occupations. In model 2a, Women work 5.6 hours less, on average, than men. This gender gap is not attributable to differing occupations since the regression holds occupational groupings constant. We suspect the gap reflects the persistence of women's disproportionate obligation for child rearing. Age is also an important factor. The relationship between age and work hours is curvilinear. Looking at the coefficients for age and age-squared together we see that work hours rise an average of 1.4 hours for each additional year of age, but peak at age 43.9 and decrease thereafter. We hypothesize that the rise of work hours with age during workers' twenties and thirties reflects the structure

of most jobs which demand an increasing amount of work time from workers who hope to rise in responsibility, position and pay. By the time most workers reach their mid-forties the most competitive phase for advancement to elite positions may be over and they settle in for more comfortable work-hour patterns. This prevalent job structure, which demands most hours precisely during the time of life when workers have young children, may partly explain the public outcry about “a time crunch” for families.

(Table 1 about here)

The findings presented in Table 2-A regarding occupational differences in work hours also fits the existing literature. Workers were divided among 5 occupational groupings: managers, professionals, other white collar workers, blue collar workers and service workers. We created 4 dummy variables, with service workers (the group with the least average weekly hours) being the reference group. Table 2-A shows that, holding gender constant, in comparison to service workers managers put in the most average hours, with 6 hours more than service workers, followed by professionals with 4.3 more hours. Blue collar workers and other white collar workers worked 2.2 hours more per week than service workers, but the difference was not statistically significant.

(Table 2 about here)

As previously discussed we interpret the greater work hours of managers and professionals to reflect the corporate strategy to maximize shareholder value by elongating the work day for employees with functions that cannot be automated or assigned to temporary workers. This interpretation of the data is bolstered by looking at another variable in table 2-A which explores the relationship between work hours and work function. Workers were asked whether they supervise other workers. Those who

hold a supervisory position work an average of 4.1 more hours a week than workers who do not. This finding supports our hypothesis that the workers who are putting in longer hours are performing functions that cannot be easily automated, temporized or outsourced. While the existing literature has mostly focused on occupational groupings, it is striking that having a supervisory function can mean a greater difference to average work hours than occupational differences. For example, the 4.1 hour difference between a professional who supervises and one who does not is almost double the 2.1 hour difference between a professional and a blue collar worker. To appreciate the extent of work hours polarization by occupational grouping and function, consider that most managers are also supervisors creating a combined effect of working *9 hours* more per week than a non-supervisory service worker.

Thus far our regression data have confirmed the finding of other work hour studies that the dispersion of work hours is patterned by some personal characteristics such as gender and age, as well as occupational grouping. We additionally noted the importance of having a supervisory position, which shares with most management and professional jobs the quality of requiring trained human discretion. In our next regression Model B, we consider an additional set of variables which have hitherto not received much attention in the work hours literature, but which we believe shed some light on the corporate strategies to generate longer work hours. Because the type of workers which companies seek to have work longer hours tend to be in high status occupational categories and positions within these occupations, we hypothesize that attaining long work hours from these employees cannot be achieved by hierarchical dictates that offend the workers' sense of autonomous professionalism. Rather, long

hours are expected to result from an organization of work that exerts subtle pressures. Indeed, as regression model 2-B will show, workplace organization variables turned out to also be extremely important and provide a glimpse at how long hours workplaces operate. As suspected, they do not coerce long work hours or intense work by management dictates, but foster intensification through tight deadlines, often conveyed directly by customers, and by keeping their workers wired to the workplace at all times.

Looking at Table 2-B, it can be seen that one of the most important determinants of work hours is whether or not a job involves tight deadlines. Workers at workplaces with tight deadlines on average work 2.9 hours more per week. To appreciate the relative importance of this variable, note that working under tight deadlines has a virtually the same impact on work hours as the difference between being a professional and a service worker. In general, the relative importance of the tight deadlines variable suggests that work hours are not simply determined by the general demands of certain occupational categories or ones' position within such category, but to a significant extent vary depending on how management *organizes* the work process. Organizing work in a manner that regularly imposes tight deadlines leads to greater work hours not only for managers and professionals, but also among other occupational categories. These tight deadlines do not seem to function like traditional speedups where bosses demand more work in less time.

We get a fuller sense of how the typical long hours workplace is organized by examining a set of variables which asked workers what factors determine the pace of their work. The pace variables reveal that long work hours are associated with workplaces where deadlines are not set by dictatorial bosses, but in more indirect way. In

fact, the regression shows that workers who report being at a workplace where “orders of boss” are important in determining their work pace tend to work *shorter* hours. Of all the various determinants of work pace the only one that was statistically significant and positively associated with long work hours was being determined by “requests from customers.” All else equal, workers whose work pace is set by customers tend to work 2.3 hours more than other workers. Rather than a hierarchical command and control management system with a boss telling workers how fast they have to work, long work hours are most typically found at workplaces that expose workers in an unmediated way to the demands of customers. These data suggest that one indirect but effective way to pressure workers to put in more hours may be simply to increase the number of customer accounts for which they are responsible. Waiting customers pestering workers to provide prompt service may be more effective than the employer directly asking workers to put in extra hours. Consistent Putting this together with the previously discussed tight deadlines variables we conclude that the long work hours workplace are organized by management strategies that maintain tight deadlines by removing any shields between workers and the demands of customers for prompt performance.

Regression model 2-B further reveals that another significant variable in determining work hours was whether the respondent has cell phone or pager that makes him/her available after normal work hours. Being “wired” to the office through the possession of such cell phone or pager, in addition to making any time or place a potential work moment, in fact increased average work hours by 3.4 per week. This finding confirms the common impression that possession of these new telecommunication devices does in fact lead to working more hours. Whether at the park

for a Saturday picnic with the family or vacationing on the beach, work is only a ring away. We can only speculate that email has likewise increased the reach of work. Like tight deadlines emanating from customers, the possession of a cell phone or pager is not an explicit management demand for more work hours but an indirect means of attaining the same goal simply by making the worker available to colleagues, customers or the boss.

Looking at these variables in aggregate, we begin to see the outline of the long-hours workplace. It does not directly coerce long work hours but fosters long hours in more subtle ways such as exposing workers to tight deadlines directly from customers, or by making workers accessible through new forms of telecommunications. While these variables provide some hints about what the long-hours work place looks like, the overall causal mechanism becomes clear upon examining the results of the survey's battery of questions regarding the causes of overtime work.

The ILE survey asked respondents to rank the importance, or lack thereof, of seven specific factors that may motivate them to work overtime. This unique set of questions enables us to analyze the issue of causation in a more systematic and nuanced manner than has been thus far possible in the existing literature. The seven motivation questions embody some of the leading hypotheses about the causes of long work hours. To test the economists' focus on material motivation, employees were asked whether they work extra hours because they want *extra pay* or because they are seeking to *advance* within the company. To find out whether there is direct employer coercion to work more hours workers were asked whether they work extra hours because they are "*required to*" do so, or need to do so "to get the work done." To examine Hochschild's

thesis, employees were asked whether they work extra hours because they “*enjoy the work,*” or because the respondent “*enjoy the workplace and co-workers.*” Finally, to test our own hypothesis that long work hours are the product of shareholder value management strategies which seek to pressure employees without appearing coercive, employees were asked whether they put in extra hours because they are “*unofficially expected to*” by the company or boss.

In regression model 2-C, we added to the previous model this set of 7 possible reasons to work extra hours. When regressing these 7 factors against hours worked, and holding constant all the other independent variables that we previously discussed, it is a striking finding that only *one* factor is statistically significant and positively correlated to working more hours: working extra hours because the employee is “unofficially expected to” do so. The importance of being “unofficially expected” to work overtime by your supervisor or company supports our earlier findings regarding the organization of work that correspond to long work hours. The significance of tight deadlines, cell phones and pagers, and a pace set by customers, neatly fit together with unofficial expectations to present a portrait of the long-hours workplace as one that does not directly require long hours by managerial fiat, but utilizes indirect and subtle managerial tactics to pressure workers to work such hours.

The unique importance of indirect and unofficial forms of managerial pressures to work long hours is further supported by considering the meanings of the *negative* coefficients for other reasons workers may work extra hours. Working overtime for extra pay has a *negative coefficient* of -2.4 hours. This means that respondents who are motivated to work long hours for direct financial gain on average work *lesshours* than

workers for whom this is not an important reason. This finding is not surprising since the workers most motivated to work long work hours by financial concerns are those who are not working enough hours.² Furthermore, the negative coefficient of 1.1 hours for being “required to” work extra hours also supports our prior findings regarding management practices at long hours workplaces. Just as workplaces where the pace of work is set by dictates of the boss are not associated with long hours, these data show that long work hours are also not typically the result of direct managerial coercion to work extra time. The negative coefficient to being “required” to work extra hours (though not statistically significant) indicates that those who work overtime because they are “required to” on average work less hours than those for whom this is not an important reason.

If long work hours are not the result of management coercion, perhaps workers put in extra hours out of enjoyment of their work? It is commonly thought that workers, and especially professionals and managers, work long hours because they are enjoyably engrossed in their work or find the work environment pleasant to linger in. For example, in her well-known book the *Time Bind* Hochschild claimed that long work hours are partly attributable to the familial atmosphere at the workplace where colleagues enjoy being with each other. Regression model 2-C, however, shows that enjoyment of work and enjoyment of colleagues do not have a statistically significant relationship to work hours. In other words, those who said that enjoyment of work or of colleagues is an important reason for working overtime were not different in their work hours, in a statistically significant way, than those who said that enjoyment of work or colleagues is

² This finding is also borne out by our analysis of the relationship between financial difficulties and work hours. Respondents who reported to be having a tough time financially are working *shorter* hours than those who are doing fine.

not an important reason. While many workers reported enjoying their work and work environment, this fact did not distinguish among those who actually did work more hours.

The singular importance of “unofficial expectations” as the only factor that is positively and significantly associated with long work hours can be seen in even starker terms by looking at the relationship between the 7 various reasons to work extra hours and the likelihood of an employee working overtime.

(Table 3 about here)

In table 3, the same independent variables were regressed against a new binary dependent variable labeled “overtime.” This dependent variable divides the respondents into those who reported usually or frequently working overtime (coded with value =1) and those who reported only doing so sometimes or never (value = 0). When looking at what factors make it more likely that a worker will *in fact* work overtime, we can see that the only statistically significant reason was being “unofficially expected to” work overtime. The 0.19 positive coefficient means that workers who reported that unofficial managerial expectations was an important reason to work overtime were 19% more likely, all else equal, to usually or frequently work overtime. Astonishingly, in this regression “unofficial expectations” are the second most powerful predictor, following being a manager, of whether an employee is likely to usually or frequently work overtime. It is a more important predictor than gender, being a professional or a supervisor, among others. This finding strongly supports our prior conclusion regarding the importance of management strategies that seek to extract long work hours through creating subtle and indirect pressures.

VI. CONCLUSION

This paper explored the causes of long work hours among Californians. Our findings suggest that long work hours are not merely the result of a gendered division of labor or occupation specific work hour patterns. While these factors are clearly important, they do not explain variations within gender and occupational groupings. Further analysis of the data suggested that long work hours are not typically the result of employee enjoyment or their work or workplace, of direct employer coercion, or of a desire to earn more money. Instead, our findings support the hypothesis that workers putting in longer hours are subject to managerial regimes where they face “unofficial expectations” to work extra hours.

As discussed at the start of this paper we believe these management strategies can be traced to the rise of the shareholder value conception of the corporation. Under this conception, executives seek to minimize all labor costs in order to maximize financial returns for shareholders. For workers who cannot be replaced by machines or temporary workers because their work involves trained human discretion, the strategy is to hire fewer of them and to pressure them to work longer hours. In this way employers perceive themselves to be eliminating the unnecessary “fat” and making sure that those who remain do not fall into the complacent laziness characteristic of the 1970s economic malaise.

Since the employees that companies seek to motivate to work harder and longer are typically salaried professionals, managers and/or in supervisory positions, employers cannot simply obtain greater work hours through dictatorial measures. Such a step would undoubtedly elicit resistance by offending these employees’ sense of professional

autonomy. Instead, as the data in this paper show, employers implement strategies that create “unofficial expectations” which subtly pressure employees to put in more work hours. Such unofficial expectations may, for example, be conveyed through tight deadlines coming directly from customers (not bosses). Alternatively, making colleagues available to each other and to customers for calling after-hours with an urgent work related question is not experienced as a coercive requirement to work. Yet, as our data show, is it quite effective in achieving this goal.

Ultimately this study raises more questions than it answers. Nevertheless, it points the direction for the much needed further research. Future studies could fruitfully explore how unofficial expectations are conveyed to workers? Or, how are new telecommunication devices being used to increase work hours? This kind of analysis could help workers, citizens and policymakers consider the optimal measures for dealing with the social problems associated with overwork.

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Table 1 Hours Means

	Mean Hours	S.D.	N
Men	44.5	11.59	396
Women	39.06	11.88	487
Managers	48.06	12.36	91
Professionals	42.91	12.34	311
Other White Collar	38.94	9.79	192
Blue Collar	41.76	9.33	163
Service	36.62	15	117

Table 2 Hours - how many hours per week usually work

Independent Variables	Model A (hours)		Model B (hours)		Model C (hours)	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
gender (Women = 1)	** -5.60	0.809	** -4.82	0.813	** -3.14	0.901
age	** 1.17	0.172	** 1.16	0.17	** 1.08	0.211
agesq	** -.01	0.002	** -.01	0.002	** -0.01	0.002
managers	** 6.04	1.549	** 4.91	1.56	** 4.61	1.711
professionals	** 4.30	1.244	** 3.05	1.27	1.61	1.524
other white collar	2.17	1.26	1.28	1.27	1.48	1.645
blue collar	2.23	1.24	** 2.66	1.25	1.68	1.506
supervise	** 4.15	0.809	** 2.94	0.83	** 2.07	0.915
tight deadlines			** 2.96	0.78	** 3.82	0.887
cell or pager			** 3.38	0.92	** 2.94	0.941
pace set by:						
customers			** 2.31	1.04	1.43	1.24
boss			-1.6	0.86	** -3.55	0.989
coworkers			-1.51	0.79	-1.66	-1.66
Work extra hours because:						
required to					-1.17	0.961
unofficially expected to					** 2.80	0.957
want extra pay					** -2.43	0.975
want advance in company					1.08	0.993
need to get work done					-1.59	1.426
enjoy work					1.58	1.27
enjoy workplace/colleagues					0.845	1.058
<u>Constant</u>	** 16.26	3.316	** 15.06	3.4	** 20.81	4.496
R Squared	0.205		0.245		0.241	

* P < .05

**P < .01

Table 3 Overtime How often work overtime
 0 = sometimes or never work overtime
 1 = usually or frequently work overtime

Independent Variables	Model A Coef.	(overtime)) (S.E.)	Model B Coef.	(overtime) (S.E.)	Model C Coef.	(overtime) (S.E.)
gender (Women = 1)	**-.74	0.158	**-.63	0.165	-0.36	0.193
age	*0.09	0.037	*0.08	0.038	0.037	0.049
agesq	*-0.001	0.005	0.0009	0.0004	-0.0006	0.0006
managers	**1.2	0.329	**1.08	0.343	**1.09	0.421
professionals	*0.61	0.245	0.5	0.259	0.12	0.318
other white collar	-0.34	0.273	-0.41	0.285	-0.37	0.352
blue collar	0.06	0.27	0.12	0.283	-0.211	0.345
supervise	**0.65	0.154	**0.44	0.164	0.31	0.192
tight deadlines			**0.73	0.162	**0.57	0.193
cell or pager pace set by:			**0.5	0.183	0.233	0.212
customers			0.19	0.2	0.1	0.242
boss			*-0.34	0.173	**-.6	0.213
coworkers			0.16	0.163	0.09	0.189
Work extra hours because:						
required to					0.06	0.215
unofficially expected to					**0.87	0.21
want extra						
pay					-0.22	0.21
want advance in company					0.04	0.21
need to get work done					0.12	0.308
enjoy work					0.2	0.259
enjoy workplace/colleagues					0.15	0.224
<u>Constant</u>	**-.2.2	0.74	**-.2.4	0.773	-1.05	1.056

* z < .05

**z < .01

Table 4 OVER45

0 = work 45 hours or less per week
 1 = work more than 45 hours per week

Independent Variables	Model A (over45)		Model B (over45)		Model C (over45)	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
gender (Women = 1)	** -0.88	0.176	-0.77	0.184	** -0.59	0.205
age	** 0.14	0.045	** .12	0.046	0.1	0.056
agesq	** -0.002	0.0005	* -0.001	0	-0.001	0
managers	** 1.04	0.347	** 0.98	0.374	* 1.04	0.42
professionals	0.41	0.292	0.29	0.317	0.03	0.368
other white collar	0.003	0.328	-0.21	0.35	0.27	0.412
blue collar	0.11	0.322	0.26	0.344	0.19	0.396
supervise	** 0.7	0.178	* 0.4	0.19	0.37	0.211
tight deadlines			** 0.75	0.189	** 0.63	0.213
cell or pager			** 0.9	0.189	** 0.72	0.208
pace set by:						
customers			0.08	0.238	-0.02	0.269
boss			-0.29	0.192	-0.51	0.221
coworkers			-0.06	0.184	-0.13	0.202
Work extra hours because:						
required to					0.15	0.224
unofficially expected to					** 0.75	0.217
want extra pay					** -0.61	0.224
want advance in company					0.28	0.229
need to get work done					-0.55	0.341
enjoy work					0.43	0.292
enjoy workplace/colleagues					-0.03	0.239
<u>Constant</u>	** -4.2	0.914	** -4.3	0.955	** -3.4	1.23

* P < .05

**P < .01