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Union Growth, Recruitment Strategy and Women Workers

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Among the explanations regarding unionisation in Australia there is an implicit assumption that recruitment strategy is not a significant explanation of union growth. This article challenges this assumption and, in the process, will also contest another more explicit assertion regarding patterns of unionisation: that women traditionally have been difficult to organise (see Gardner and Palmer 1993). These assertions have persisted alongside frequent exhortations that unions devote more attention to organising efforts to arrest declining union densities and despite the dramatic increase in female union density since the 1960s. Recent studies in Britain and the United States have pointed to the significance of recruitment strategies to unionisation levels and ability of unions to arrest membership attrition through aggressive and intensive organising (Kelly and Heery 1989; Chaison and Rose 1991). American scholars have also contested the assertion that women are less organisable than men (Kochan 1979; Goldfield 1987), a view echoed in Australia by Peetz (1990) who proposes greater recruitment efforts by unions to increase female unionisation levels. Yet little is known about past union recruitment efforts and the conditions for successful female organising. This article brings the orthodox conventions into focus through a close examination of the dramatic growth in the 1970s of the Australian Telephone and Phonogram Operators' Association (Queensland Branch).

Formed in 1914, the Australian Telephone and Phonogram Officers' Association\(^1\) organised the telephonists and small number of phonogramists employed in

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\(^1\) In this paper, this union is referred to as the Telephonists' Union. From its formation in 1914 until December 1, 1975, it was known as the Commonwealth Telephone and Phonogram Operators' Association.
telecommunications services. Its membership was always predominately female, women having dominated the working of manual telephone exchanges in Australia since the inception of telephony at the turn of the century. In 1989 the union amalgamated with the Communication Workers' Union within which it forms a sub-branch which still organises almost all the telephonists employed by Telecom.\(^2\) Between 1975 and 1982, the union's membership increased from 56\% to 91\% of Telecom's telephonists nationally. The case study is the Queensland Branch\(^3\) which swelled from 65\% to 97\% membership density between July 1972 and June 1978, most of this growth occurring in the first year of this period. The paper relates the Branch's growth to a combination of forces including institutional supports, employment concentration, demographics, wages, job security, and union structure, militancy and recruitment strategy. The importance of these factors to the Branch's unionisation levels varied over time. While deteriorating employment conditions underpinned its growth through the period, demographic changes were crucial to the first growth spurt and the Branch's recruitment strategy was critical as its membership density approached saturation point.

Telephonists and phonogramists\(^4\) were traditionally engaged in a classically white-collar occupation. The work of telephonists, for instance, included booking and connecting telephone calls, assistance with telephone numbers and the charging and billing of calls. In addition to these routine tasks, telephonists commonly had personalised relationships with subscribers. In country and suburban areas they typically functioned as a focal point for local

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\(^2\) In the 1960s and 1970s, phonogram operators comprised 4-7\% of the union nationally (Postmaster-Generals' Dept 1969 and 1970; Australian Post Office 1971, 1972 and 1974; Telecom 1976, 1977, 1978a and 1979). As phonogram operators form such a small proportion of the union's membership, this paper refers primarily to telephonists. Until recently, Telecom was the monopoly supplier of telephone services in Australia. The Federal Government established it in July 1975, removing responsibility for telephone services from the Australian Post Office. Telephonists and phonogram operators were therefore employed by the Australian post Office until July 1975 and from then, Telecom.

\(^3\) Data on the Branch's growth is drawn from its Minutes of Meetings for the period. Membership details are given in the minutes of almost very meeting. The Australian Telephone and Phonogram Operators' Association has a Branch in each state. The number of telephonists in NSW and Victoria has always exceeded that in Queensland.

\(^4\) The work of phonogram operators involved receiving telephone messages and delivering them to the addressee in written form like telegrams.
communities, acting as advice bureau, receptionist and emergency service. Subscribers would ring telephonists for comfort or to hear a friendly voice, and for advice on such things as cooking, where to buy particular commodities and which tradespeople to hire. Telephonists also provided an answering and message service (Reinecke and Schultz 1983; Moyal 1984). Rapid changes in technology, especially the advent of computerisation, had transformed the occupation for metropolitan telephonists by the 1960s into more standardised, technically controlled and closely monitored work. However it remained a characteristically white collar, service occupation in the country exchanges where telephonists had closer community links than their metropolitan counterparts for longer. The personal contact receded as rural exchanges closed and operations were automated and centralised through the 1970s and 1980s.

The next section reviews the literature on the determinants of union growth generally and white-collar union growth in particular. As a prelude to exploring the growth of the Telephonists' Union (Queensland Branch), the following section looks at the context in which this occurred. Technological developments and changes in employer structure dramatically altered the nature of telecommunications employment in the 1960s and 1970s. The final two sections examine the phases of the Branch's growth before the paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for union growth analysis in Australia.

Explaining Union Growth

Much of the literature on union growth has been devoted to identifying macro-determinants of union density. These suggested determinants have included the business cycle, public policy, employer opposition, union organising activity, political institutions, shifts in the employment structure, and public opinion (Chaison and Rose 1991). Chaison and Rose concluded that the first four influences are critical to union growth. This contrasts with the early work of Bain (1970) on white-collar unions which based their growth on three strategic
variables: employment concentration, union recognition and government action. Bain's study attributed little importance to economic position, employment conditions, job security and union recruitment policies. Indeed, Bain (1970: 183) maintained that such factors are of "negligible importance".

However, in a later attempt to explain the union membership explosion between 1971 and 1974 in Britain, Bain and Price (1976) ascribed a dominant role to economic factors, particularly the rate of change in wages and prices. Adam's (1974: 176) earlier work also suggested that "dissatisfaction with employment conditions and the expectation of benefit from union membership are closely associated with union growth". In Britain, Jenkins and Sherman (1979) similarly pointed to the role of declining relative salaries, combined with organisational restructuring and increasing white collar unemployment and redundancy. Price (1983) concluded that for the drive to unionisation to occur, there must emerge an important material issue such as a decline in real income or threats of redundancy. However, the relative importance of these factors for Australian trade unionism has as yet received little attention.

Debate on the importance of union organising efforts to growth also followed Bain's early comments on their insignificance. Contrary to Bain's arguments, Adams (1977) suggested that unions play a significant role in persuading workers to join unions through such means as recruitment policies (see also Undy et al. 1981). More recently, Kelly and Heary (1989) argued that unions affect aggregate membership growth by favourably influencing worker perceptions of effectiveness through such mechanisms as recruitment campaigns, the circulation of information about union achievements and industrial actions. In the United States, long-term downward trends in union organising activity and success have been identified as major determinants of declining union density (see Chaison and Rose 1991). Recent American literature has positively associated union recruitment efforts with union
density increases (Goldfield 1987; Chaison and Rose 1991), although finding that organising success may be reduced as unions approach saturation (Goldfield 1987).

The conventional view is that union organising contributes to union growth in widely varying degrees from country to country. Hence there has been considerable research on this in the United States where organising efforts are necessitated by the union certification procedures. Australia is commonly regarded as a country in which organising is not of great importance (Chaison and Rose 1991). It is argued that union growth has primarily been facilitated by the arbitration system, particularly the union security provisions it enforces, with structural change also a major explanatory factor (see Dabscheck and Niland 1981; Deery and Plowman 1991). In support of this view, the recent workplace industrial relations survey found that union officials typically devoted little time or effort to organising activities (Callus et al. 1991). This does not preclude active recruitment efforts as organising is not necessarily a top-down activity, but it strongly suggests that few resources are devoted to membership recruitment. Limited shopfloor organisation in many Australian unions may have contributed to the suggested lack of organising activity. Hancke (1993) argues that local union organisation is a" conditio sine qua non" for membership recruitment. However, in attributing little importance to union recruitment, explanations of union growth in Australia tie union density to central institutions and attribute to unions themselves no active role in encouraging membership at the local level, irrespective of formal shopfloor organisation. Histories of individual unions have documented past organising efforts and successes, but typically they have not analysed the role of recruitment in union growth. There is therefore little analysis of the importance of recruitment strategy to union density levels in Australia. Yet as Gardner and Palmer (1992) point out, recruitment policies are typically recommended as the means of raising union memberships.
In addition to studying macro-determinants of union growth, scholars have dwelt on determinants of the individual decision to unionise. For instance, a strongly supported proposition links the unionisation decision to instrumentality beliefs: workers' perceptions of the capacity of unions to produce desired results (see, Wheeler and McClendon 1991). In exploring the individual decision to unionise, many researchers have argued that women are inherently more difficult to organise than men (see Goldfield 1987). American data on the propensity and desire of women to unionise does not support this proposition (Kochan 1979, Goldfield 1987). In Australia, Peetz (1990) found that 60% of the difference in union density between men and women could be explained by differences in the industry and occupational structure and employment status of males and females. Peetz also suggested that lower female union density levels might reflect poorer organising efforts by unions in relation to women workers.

The conditions for successful organising of women by unions has recently attracted increased attention as the workforce participation of women and union decline have increased the significance of unionising women workers. In the United States, Cobble (1991) demonstrated the importance of an occupational union structure and sex-specific local union organisation to female unionisation and activism. Turbin's (1992) study shows that craft unionism and close family ties among women participants in a particular occupation are associated with high unionisation and militancy of women workers. Female organisers have also been linked to successful union recruitment of women (Meyerowitz 1985). Traditionally low unionisation rates of women have been tied to women's family responsibilities, the suggestion being that meeting times and other union activities are precluded by women's domestic responsibilities, child care difficulties and the possible resentment of spouses. In the United States, Schur and Kruse (1992) recently contested the suggestion that these factors have inhibited women's union activities. They argue that nonunion women are more interested in unionising than comparable men. They suggest another explanatory factor: union
inexperience in establishing organising drives for the types of jobs commonly held by women. In Australia, the importance of such factors as union structure and strategy, workforce composition and domestic responsibilities to women's unionisation rates remains unclear.

Discussions of union growth in Australia typically have made little critical analysis of the role of union instrumentality beliefs, demographics or recruitment strategy, while concentrating on institutional factors. Lansbury's (1980) study of eight large white collar unions in the 1970s, for instance, found that most experienced considerable gains during the period 1970-1974 but only minor gains from 1974-77. Lansbury identifies a range of reasons for this growth including the negotiation of automatic union fee deductions from salaries after 1970, the progressive industrial relations policies of the Whitlam Labor Government in the early 1970s, the increased number and expertise of union staff and the numerical increase in female membership. Hence Lansbury's findings concur with those of Bain (1970) on the significance of government action, and Chaison and Rose (1991) on public policy, while also highlighting the role played by internal union developments. In his study of banking and insurance unions in Australia, Griffin (1985) also emphasised the impact of state institutions on union growth, through mechanisms as union preference and check off provisions, while finding in addition that increased militancy and successful industrial action by white collar unions spurred membership growth. Hill's (1982) history of the Australian Bank Officers' Association identifies the centralisation of banking into suburban branches as conducive to union growth due to the "proximity effect" of personal interactions among relatively large groups of workers. Hill also argued that high turnover rates, of female and young male employees, and industry bureaucratisation, with head office expansion and the establishment of large administrative centres, were associated with a declining union density. By pointing to differential effects of centralisation, this latter argument contradicts Bain's assertions on the role of employment concentration.
With the exception of Hill (1982) who briefly mentions union organising and differential workers' attitudes towards unionism by age and sex, these studies do not examine the role of union recruitment strategies and the union instrumentality of workers or the interaction of these with the environmental determinants they identify. While white-collar union density increased substantially during the 1970s, particular unions experienced differential rates of growth (Lansbury 1980). However, before we can develop comparative explanations for union growth patterns in Australia more detailed study of particular unions is necessary. The remainder of this paper addresses the causal interrelation of factors to the growth of the Telephonists' Union in the 1970s.

The Telephonists' Union's Growth and its Industrial Context

The Telephonists' Union (Queensland branch) grew by 49% in the six years after July 1972 to achieve 97% membership density. Lansbury's study of eight national white-collar unions (although it does not distinguish branch growth rates) found four had a growth rate exceeding 50% between 1970 and 1977. Hence among white-collar unions the Queensland Branch's density growth was moderate.

As Table 1 shows, the growth occurred in two distinct phases. Between July 1972 and June 1973 there was a 37.1% leap in the union's Queensland membership. In the following five years to 1978, as the Branch approached saturation its density increased 9.3%, an unusually high growth rate during this period. Lansbury (1980) found the growth of white-collar unions dropped to minimal levels or actually stopped in the 1974-77 period except in those which had compulsory unionism agreements with employers. The Telephonists' Union was party to no such agreements at this time. Hence its continued growth was exceptional.
Table 1. Unionisation of Queensland Telephonists & Phonogramists, 1971-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (30 June)</th>
<th>No. of Workers</th>
<th>No. of ATPOA Members</th>
<th>ATPOA density (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1769</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1812</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1751</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>- *</td>
<td>1709</td>
<td>- *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>1513</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1582</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1561</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These figures are not available. The postal and telephone services were restructured in July 1975 with the establishment of Telecom and neither the Australian Post Office nor Telecom published employment data on telephonists and phonogramists for that financial year (see the next section).


The Telephonists' Union (Queensland Branch) grew within a context of technological change, organisational restructuring and shifting employer policy. For most of this century, telephonists and phonogram operators were employed by the Postmaster-Generals' Department, operating as the Australian Post Office. In 1975, the Commonwealth Government established Telecom to manage telecommunications services in Australia. Telecom's industrial relations strategy differed greatly to that of its predecessor. However, changes in the employment environment of the Telephonists' Union's membership were well underway before the advent of Telecom.
The Australian Post Office was Australia's largest employer. Two-thirds of its staff of 85,000 were employed on telecommunications work (CITS, 1982: 166). They were employed under the Public Service Act 1922 which applied to most Commonwealth public servants. The Public Service Board and Australian Post Office shared responsibility for employment relations (Vemon: 116), the Board controlling remuneration, working conditions, staffing levels and classifications while the latter regulated workplace conditions. Post Offices were characteristically multi-union sites. Twenty eight unions organised the workforce in 1974 (Vemon: 117). Industrial relations policies were poorly co-ordinated, lacking uniformity between offices. A specialist industrial relations branch was not established in the national office until 1969 and in state offices in 1973. Responsibility for these matters remained diffuse within state, regional and local offices. Industrial disputes were referred to the Public Service Arbitrator (Vernon Report: 122-3), a specialist conciliation and arbitration tribunal abolished in 1984.

Australia Post had not recognised the need for a specialist industrial relations branch until the Federal Government altered its funding arrangements. Traditionally the Federal budget had funded the telecommunications service. In 1968, the Government gave the Post Office lump sum control over telecommunications expenditure, but not revenue. This contributed to a cultural change in the organisation, the public service ethos being replaced by engineering and economic priorities. The "family character" of telecommunications employment crumbled (Williams 1988).

In 1975, the Vernon Report recommended that separate statutory authorities, independent of the Public Service Board provide postal and telecommunications services. It also recommended more sophisticated industrial relations practices, the establishment of consultative processes and the removal of industrial disputes from the Public Service

Telecom's establishment clearly ushered in a more corporate approach to telecommunications delivery. According to Moyal (1984: 299), the Governor-General's appointment of former Managing Director of General Motors Holden, A.G. Gibbs, as Chief Executive and Commissioner, combined with the appointment of a chief general manager for daily operations, and severance from the Public Service Board, signified a more business-like approach. Telecom recruited new staff at middle management level, emphasised managerial training and issued a Corporate Plan which stressed the need to improve customer service, technology and staff relations and development (Moyal: 306). Telecom centralised control of industrial relations in the national and state offices (CITS: 166-7). On one hand it established a district management structure which devolved grievance settlement. Yet industrial relations policy and major employment agreements are made at national level (Williams 1988).

Telecom continued the technological change begun by Australian Post Office. All the metropolitan exchanges had been upgraded from manual to automatic by 1962 and the transition to automatic trunk dialling was well on the way by the late 1960s. By 1973, more than 61% of trunk calls were dialled by subscribers (Australian Post Office, 1973) and automation of international calls followed. Automation enabled the redirection of calls through central exchanges. Hence although Telecom built new automatic exchanges, expanded others in major centres and converted some smaller country exchanges to larger installations, it amalgamated others and closed many (Australian Post Office, 1969 and 1970). Overall, the number of exchanges fell by 15.4% in the 1960s and a further 10% in the 1970s as

Employment concentration increased for those telephonists in the growing exchanges. However, for many telephonists and phonogramists, especially those in rural exchanges, automation spelt redundancy. It was a period of rising unemployment in Australia. While many coastal Queensland towns were expanding because of booming tourism, unemployment in many inland towns was growing. Hence, because of their isolated geographical location and family responsibilities which typically prevented them accepting transfers to larger centres, rural telephonists were the most affected by redundancies. As a result, only 360 of the 2500 Telecom telephonists made redundant Australia-wide between 1974 and 1980 accepted alternative positions in the organisation (Moyal: 255).

Theorists have associated redundancy and employment concentration with union growth (Bain 1970; Hill 1982; Price 1983). In addition to these experiences, telephonists faced uncertainty as their employer's policies towards business and industrial relations changed. They considered that Australia Post had abandoned its interest in personalised service delivery, replacing it with a concern to increase profits by ever widening the range of consumer services. The Telephonists' Union's growth therefore occurred during a period of intense changes.


Between July 1972 and June 1973, a coalescence of factors which included demographic shifts and recruitment strategy produced the 37% leap in membership of the Queensland Branch of the Telephonists' Union. The leadership and membership of the Branch changed dramatically in the late 1960s. New incumbents entered almost all of its executive

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5 Data on earlier redundancies is unavailable.
positions and married women flooded into its ranks. Public policies were supportive of public sector unionism. At the same time, the union was confronted with financial pressures and competition from the Australian Postal Workers' Union. Telephonists faced job insecurity, declining relative wages, technological change and a changing employer ethos. These material issues underpinned a changing union instrumentality among telephonists and phonogramists. The Branch embarked on an organising drive which tapped this attitudinal shift.

Traditionally, supervisors had run the union. For non-supervisory telephonists, winning election to branch councils proved virtually impossible. Telephonists were reluctant to make complaints to the union, because supervisors guarded their own interests against those of telephonists (Reinecke and Schultz, 1983; Bowden, 1993). The Queensland branch was no exception. Further, the union lacked full-time staff. Its officials worked full-time as telephonists. They were harassed by managers for their union involvement (Williams 1993). Officials therefore had limited time for union activities and were unable to extensively recruit members by visiting exchanges (Minutes, 11 December 1968). Although the Branch discussed raising fees to enable employment of full-time staff, the Queensland Branch lacked the resources to hire staff until late 1974 (Minutes, 8 January 1969). Like many public sector staff associations, it was a "tame cat" union.

A change of leadership in the late 1960s ushered in an unparallelled period of activism for the branch. Several newly elected officials, including Mr. L. Murray, Mrs P. Rolph and Miss M. Ralph started challenging the longstanding executive. Murray contested the legality of the branch election in 1968, a sub-committee later finding his charges proven but nonetheless endorsing the ballot (Minutes, 15 July and 11 December 1968). Following these allegations, the Branch elected Murray to be Vice-President. When Murray later assumed the post of Assistant Secretary, Pat Rolph replaced him as Vice-President (Minutes, 11 December 1968 and 8 January 1969). In October 1968, Rolph and Ralph had succeeded in instituting a
trial alteration of Branch Council meeting times from the evening to late afternoon. Despite opposition from the incumbent Secretary and President, afternoon meetings soon became the standard practice, allowing members to attend after the day shift (Minutes, 9 October 1968 and 19 February 1969).

Several of the new officials were representative of the growing number of outspoken and militant male telephonists (Reinecke and Schultz 1983; Minutes, 15 July 1968 and 13 October 1969). Others were representative of a new breed of telephonist: married women with an expectation of permanent employment (Williams 1993). Married women had been excluded from employment in the Commonwealth Public Service. The Commonwealth Government's legislative removal of the marriage bar in November 1966, opposed by the Telephone's Union, led to an influx of married women into Telecom's telephone exchanges, many of whom now sought employment until they reached retirement age. These telephonists were typically not as accepting of employment conditions as had been the younger single women, who had a high turnover rate (Williams; Minutes of Council Meetings). As Hill (1982: 257) wrote of bank employees, high turnover restricts unionism because it reduces the incentive to join and a union's opportunity to organise individual workers. Married female telephonists with expectations of permanency had more reason to seek protection of their long term interests. The Branch's leadership reflected this demographic change. Half the officials had always been women, all of whom were single. By July 1968, three Branch officials were married women and the participation of married women on the Committee rose thereafter (Minutes, for instance 15 July 1968 and 13 October 1969).

A priority of the new leadership was to increase its membership. Faced with competition from the Australian Postal Workers' Union, financial pressures and declining real wages for telephonists, the Branch embarked on a recruitment drive, concentrating on country exchanges. Many telephonists in rural Queensland had proved less than willing to join the
union for several reasons. First, those in small rural exchanges were very isolated, and worked in small groups often in highly conservative towns in which there were generally few alternative employment opportunities. They tended to lack the confidence to raise industrial issues. Second, these telephonists had usually had little contact with the union and little awareness of its benefits. The union had no formal shopfloor structure and officials lacked the resources to visit exchanges. Maintaining members was also difficult when dues were collected manually because the Branch had little shopfloor organisation. The Australian Post Office's agreement to automatic payroll deductions in October 1970 allayed this difficulty (Minutes, October 1970; Newsletter, March 1976; Williams 1993; Bowden 1993).

Financial pressures had plagued the union nationally since the mid-1960s because of increasing administrative costs (Minutes, 14 July 1965). The Queensland branch committed itself to increasing membership density and courting existing rural members through quarterly news bulletins (Minutes, 14 July 1965). The NSW and South Australian branches subsequently recorded substantial deficits in 1966 (Minutes, 14 September 1966). This intensified the pressure to increase income from membership dues.

The need to strengthen the Branch's resources was tied not only to immediate financial survival but also the union's effectiveness in negotiating salary improvements. In 1969, Branch officials had recognised the need for greater negotiating expertise (Minutes, 8 January 1969). This became more pressing in the early 1970s when to the alarm of the union's members, the Public Service Board argued against salary increases for telephonists on the basis of comparison with salaries of their non-public service counterparts, a comparison which neglected the overaward conditions for private sector telephonists. Not only were other public servants not subject to external comparisons, but this represented a change of Public Service Board policy, the Board having previously opposed external comparisons for telephonists' wages. The Board also linked the salary claim to the introduction of part-time work and
extension of night work to women. Many women were opposed to working night shifts on safety and remuneration grounds, the latter because the hourly rate for night duty was lower than for day duty as for the same weekly wage, longer working hours were involved. Many members believed the union's national officials were poorly representing their interests in these negotiations due to a lack of expertise in advocacy (Minutes, 10 November 1971; 9 February 1972 and 14 February 1973). The union failed to either stem the introduction of night duty for women and the extension of part-time work or hasten the resolution of the salary claim. It was not until August 1973, after two years of negotiations, that the Public Service Arbitrator determined a salary rise for telephonists tied to the introduction of part-time work and night duty for women (Minutes, 3 December 1973).

The occupationally based Telephonists' Union also faced an aggressive challenge from the Australian Postal Workers' Union in the early 1970s. The Postal Workers' Union, which organised most postal services staff and had 45,000 members in the Australian Post Office was six times the size of the Telephonists' Union (Vernon Report 1975). It lodged claims to change its rules to cover telephonists and phonogramists among other classifications, in January 1969 and February 1970. The Telephonists' Union objected (C.A.R. 1977). However, as the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission did not hear this matter until January 1974, the Telephonists' Union had five years in which to raise its membership density. The union's increased and high membership density was one of the factors on which the Commission based its decision against the competing union's claims (C.A.R. 1977).

In response to these pressures, the Queensland Branch embarked on a conscious recruitment drive. Lacking full-time officials, it was unable to aggressively recruit in the early 1970s. Rather, organising activities included entertaining visiting country members, circulating printed information about the Branch, distributing automatic fee deduction forms to country exchanges, sending letters to all exchanges asking members to nominate shop floor
representatives and encouraging unionisation through personal contact (Minutes, for instance 10 June 1970; 29 July 1970; November 1970; and July 1973). Increased unionisation of metropolitan members was also given concrete support by the alteration in Council meetings times to the late afternoon. Although disputed by Schur and Kruse (1992), scholars have long considered night meetings a barrier to participation of women and especially married women in union affairs. The organising campaign dovetailed with the Federal Government's provision for the introduction of automatic union fee deductions from salaries (Minutes, 12 January 1971 and 16 February 1971). This probably contributed to the continued union membership of many telephonists. As Griffin (1985: 13) argued of the bank and insurance employees: "it would appear that once employees have been organised and have also agreed to automatic deduction of union dues from their salaries most such employees remain union members so long as the check-off system remains in operation".

Another spur to the unionisation of telephonists was dissatisfaction with salaries and their retrenchment and redundancy conditions. A sense of deprivation brewed among telephonists due to the slow progress of their salary claim, the Public Service Board's linking of it to lower waged private sector telephonists and the proposed introduction of night duty for women. In 1972, the Branch threatened industrial action (Minutes, 10 November 1971; 9 February 1972; and 14 June 1972). This did not speed up the process. A wage increase eluded the telephonists until late 1973.

Furthermore, by the early 1970s, with widespread retrenchment underway, the newly militant telephonists were seeking improved redundancy provisions (Williams 1973). Under Section 20 of the Public Service Act, which applied to most federal public servants, retrenched telephonists were given only superannuation, leave and furlough entitlements (Telephonists' Union Federal Executive, Letter to Branches, 26 February 1974). There was no provision for notice of exchange closures, income maintenance, severance pay, retraining or relocation of
redundant telephonists. The union did not win these until 1974 (as discussed in the next section). However, it is my contention that among telephonists in the 1970s, the poor redundancy conditions and perceived salary decline were associated with an increasingly positive attitude towards unionism as an effective means of tackling their various dissatisfactions. This was particularly the case for rural telephonists whose employment alternatives were generally meagre. Certainly the Federal Labor Government may have been partly responsible also for this growing calculative attachment to the union. As Lansbury (1980) and Griffin (1985) observed, when the Government persuaded the Public Service Arbitrator to increase annual leave entitlements for public servants, and then introduced a bill to confine the extra leave to union members, there was a rush to unionise even though the bill was never passed.

These factors acted in concert with the changing nature of employment in the Australian Post Office as management became more market driven and less paternalistic and community oriented. Telephonists were increasingly concerned that management were trading off service for profits. This may have affected their job satisfaction, workplace integration and sense of mutual sympathy with management officials. Ascertaining these is beyond the scope of this study but evidence points to a similar increase in union density and militancy of the union organising telephone technicians, the Australian Telecommunications Employees' Association, with which the Queensland Branch of the Telephonists' Union had strong links.6 The close relationship between officials of the Technicians' and Telephonists' Unions

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6 In the early 1970s, the Technicians' Union (Queensland Branch) gained a reputation for militancy. This followed a leadership change in 1970, in part a response to an agreement forged by national officials to a career structure which shattered the career opportunities of many technicians. Williams (1988) explains the militancy also in terms of Queensland's economic growth at this time which increased the bargaining power of technicians because the telephone network was expanding rapidly, and also the inconsistencies in management treatment of technicians who were widely dispersed outside the metropolitan area. Williams also argues that the changing business philosophy of the Australian Post Office had a damaging impact on the organisation's family atmosphere.
influenced the changing strategies of the latter, as did the close ties between technicians and telephonists influence their attitudes towards unionism.

Family ties were common among telecommunications workers. Like the collar workers described by Turbin (1992), young female telephonists typically worked alongside or at least in the same occupation as aunts, mothers, siblings and relations by marriage. It was not uncommon for male relatives to work as technicians. Telephonists also developed close friendships with workmates, especially because they shared unusual shiftwork hours (Bowden 1993; Williams 1993). Unionisation was facilitated by these links. Telephonists shared their frustrations about working conditions and their employer, and had a close appreciation of the similar pressures facing technicians. This partly accounts for the rapid channelling of their dissatisfactions into unionism in the 1972-73 period.

The unionisation of telephonists and phonogramists in Queensland between July 1972 and June 1973 therefore was partly due to the Federal Government's industrial relations policies and automatic union fee deductions, factors identified by Lansbury (1980) and Griffin (1985). Critical to the Branch's growth were demographic changes, although contrary to Lansbury's (1980) findings it was not an increased participation of women, but of married women, in the telecommunications workforce which was significant. This demographic shift underpinned the altered union instrumentality of telephonists, and leadership changes in the union as married women with expectations of permanent employment confronted poor salaries, retrenchment provisions and other employment conditions. Also crucial to the Branch's growth at this time was the recruitment campaign, sparked by the predatory moves of the Postal Workers' Union, financial pressures and members' demands for more effective service from the union and facilitated by the social relations of the telephonic workforce.

Williams (1988) wrote that the establishment of Telecom in 1975 ended the traditional public service employment of the telecommunications workforce, ushering in a corporate employment culture. Telecom was driven more by market than community service objectives. The automation of remaining manual exchanges and computerisation of the telephone service proceeded at a hectic pace. Retrenchment became an increasingly common fate for telephonists. The number of Queensland telephonists fell by 13% between 1974 and 1978. This was the context in which the union density of telephonists continued to increase. The second phase of growth of the Queensland Branch was not as dramatic as the first. Between July 1973 and June 1978, it grew by 9.3%, to almost fully encompass Telecom's telephonists and phonogramists in the state. The increasing union density is explained in terms of the Branch's aggressive recruitment strategy together with growing worker frustration over retrenchment conditions, an improved union shopfloor organisation, successful industrial campaigns and changing employer behaviour.

In July 1975, the Queensland Branch decided to appoint a full-time secretary/treasurer, with office facilities and support staff (Minutes, 9 July 1975). This greatly enhanced its ability to represent members. It was a step the NSW Branch had taken one month earlier and which other Branches soon emulated (Telephone Echo 1975 issues; Reinecke and Schultz 1983). The Secretary from then until her retirement in 1987, was Joyce Williams, a telephonist from Sandgate, now a suburb in the north of Brisbane, who had had little experience in union affairs but long involvement with the Australian Labor Party (Williams 1993). The Branch's resources were also improved by strengthened links with the trade union movement in the mid 1970s. The union joined the Council of Australian Government Employees Organisations in 1975 and began participating on joint committees with other Telecom unions (Minutes, 10 February 1976 and 7 April 1978; Williams 1993). Branch officials profited from the
experiences in union management of other unions such as the Technicians' Union, Australian Public Service Association and Australian Bank Employees' Union (Williams 1993).

This enhanced organisational base underpinned the Branch's recruitment drive from 1975. As in the earlier period, the recruitment strategy focused especially, but not exclusively on telephonists in rural exchanges. The strategy differed from the earlier period in its emphasis on exchange visits and the encouragement of shopfloor organisation and activity. Officials continued to encourage unionisation also through personal contacts and circulating Branch publications. Other State Branches adopted fairly similar strategies from 1975 (Telephone Echo, 1974 and 1975 issues).

Exchange visits proved a fruitful way of encouraging and reinforcing telephonist unionism. The President, Mrs. P. Rolph made the first country visits in late 1974 to six major towns: Cairns, Townsville, Mackay, Prosperine, Rockhampton and Toowoomba (Telephone Echo, October 1974). In June 1975, the President and Secretary toured 10 towns in southwest Queensland, for the first time visiting exchanges in the smaller country centres such as Charleville, Cunnamulla and Dalby (Minutes, 11 June 1975). The next tour concentrated on the coastal region north of Brisbane, extending as far as Rockhampton in the north to Clermont in the west (Minutes, 15 September 1976; Telephone Echo, October 1976). The most extensive trip, in October 1976, encompassed 20 country towns, from the central western town of Mt. Isa to Cairns (Minutes, 10 November 1976). These visits were usually the first contact of many country telephonists with union officials. In many towns, officials encountered confrontational local managers who in some cases locked them out of the exchanges. Through thwarting these lockouts, by appeals to State Telecom Managers, officials won the confidence of members at these exchanges who had remained reluctant about unionism. At each centre, the visiting officials negotiated with management on issues of local
concern. At the larger centres, they also urged members to establish a shopfloor organisation (*Minutes*, 15 September 1976; *Telephone Echo*, October 1976; Williams 1993).

Officials had begun encouraging shopfloor representation in rural exchanges in 1973 (*Minutes*, 11 July 1973). The building of a rural shopfloor organisation intensified following the appointment of the full-time Secretary who through personal contacts with country members, encouraged individuals to take on representative roles (Williams 1993; Bowden 1993). Telephonists in Southport formed the first sub-branch, following successful union-management negotiations on local grievances in June 1976 (*Newsletter*, August 1976). Branch officials announced their hope that "other provincial centres will follow Southport's initiative and consider the formation of a sub-branch of their own. This is the only way country members can have an effective voice in the Association's affairs" (*Newsletter*, August 1976). After the September 1976 visit by officials, Gladstone, Emerald and Rockhampton telephonists formed sub-branches. Members in Mackay, Nambour, Townsville and Toowoomba soon followed suit (*Newsletter*, September 1976; *Minutes*, 10 November 1976).

In January 1977, the Branch further encouraged shopfloor organisation with a decision limiting voting rights on industrial action to members of a sub-branch. This policy, consistent with that of the Technicians' Union, was to safeguard the ballot process by allowing only local officials to communicate country member votes (*Minutes*, 19 January 1977). To further strengthen the sub-branch organisation, the Branch emphasised trade union training for shopfloor officials (*Minutes*, 10 August 1977), another practice copied from the Technicians' Union (Williams 1993). To reinforce the participation of country representatives in the union, the Queensland Branch also held its Council meetings, negotiations with management and social functions to coincide with the training courses. Visiting members expressed their appreciation of these efforts in the Newsletter (for instance, *Newsletter*, August/September 1977; *Newsletter* January/February 1977, August/September 1977 and April/May 1978).
The union's new national journal and Branch newsletter also encouraged unionisation and participation of telephonists. The national office began publishing the bi-monthly *Telephone Echo* in October 1974. Over the next three years *Telephone Echo* discussed the role of unions and industrial action, women's rights, industrial justice and the mechanics of grievance processing. In January 1976, the Queensland Branch began producing its own bi-monthly newsletter, a voice for the local membership. In early editions, city members urged rural telephonists to raise grievances with the union, form sub-branches, write letters, report award breaches and "let your voices be heard down here in the concrete jungle" (for example, *Newsletter*, March and September 1976). Country members also criticised the perceived metropolitan myopia of Branch officials. Some asked officials to visit rural exchanges, a request which officials heartily met (for instance, *Newsletter*, August 1976).

The union also engaged in several major industrial campaigns from 1974 which especially, but by no means exclusively affected the targeted recruitment group, country telephonists. Most significant were the equal hours and exchange closure campaigns. Country telephonists had been working much longer hours than their metropolitan counterparts since 1924 and many faced redundancy as a result of exchange closures due to technological change. Through these campaigns, the Telephonists' Union and its Queensland branch mobilised rural telephonists, further encouraging unionisation of those who remained unorganised.

Although the Australian Post Office had been closing exchanges since the 1950s, it was not until September 1974 that the Public Service Board agreed to a retrenchment policy which included transfer, notice and retirement provisions. After further negotiations, the Board also agreed to introduce severance pay and income maintenance provisions five months later (*Telephone Echo*, February 1975). From 1976, the union campaigned vigorously for
additional improvements (see *Telephone Echo*, May 1979). Branch officials spearheaded local industrial action which typically took the form of autonomous community actions in country centres. The newly established shopfloor organisation facilitated this decentralised industrial action. Rural telephonists planned and executed campaigns which included petitions, lobbying, radio interviews and newspaper surveys of community views (*Minutes*, 10 May 1978; 9 August 1978 and 13 September 1978). They won improved income maintenance, relocation and notice of redundancy provisions through the Australian Telecommunications Commission Employees (Conditions of Redundancy) Award in late 1978 (Telecom 1978b; *Telephone Echo*, May 1979).

Country telephonists also won reduced working hours in 1978. Since the Public Service Board's Determination of 1924, telephonists had worked differential hours depending upon whether they were employed in city, suburban or country exchanges and worked day or night shifts. While telephonists in major metropolitan centres worked 34 hour weeks, rural telephonists worked 39 or 40 hour weeks depending on telephone traffic levels (*Telephone Echo*, February 1976). These disparities had long concerned rural telephonists (Minutes, 9 October 1963). Eventually, they spurred the union's officials into action (Minutes, 14 January 1976, *Newsletter*, January 1976). National negotiations on a uniform 34 hour week commenced in April 1976. The union soon modified this claim to one for a thirty six and three quarter hour week (*Newsletter*, September 1976). Telecom tied the claim to changes in part-time work conditions. Following numerous stopwork meetings and threats of industrial action, the matter was referred to arbitration (for instance *Minutes*, 12 October 1977 and 3 March 1978). In October 1978, the Commission ruled in favour of a thirty six and three quarter hour week for telephonists employed in suburban and country exchanges. The ruling also improved part-time work conditions and placed limits on the amount of part-time work (*Newsletter*, October/November 1978). In February 1981, telephonists won an unprecedented 34 hour week through the arbitration commission (*Telephone Echo*, March/April 1981).
The October 1978 working hours award provided a strong inducement to those remaining unorganised telephonists to join the union. The provisions applied only to union members. This had been one of the union's conditions, publicised to members over the two year negotiation period. Non-union members were to continue working longer hours, at lower rates of pay than their unionised counterparts (Newsletter, June/July 1978 and October/November 1978).

These industrial campaigns tapped the new militancy of telephonists as did the shopfloor organisation and new communication fora of the union. Together with country visits by officials, the growing frustration and urgency about retrenchment conditions and the restriction of new working conditions to union members, these developments contributed to and reinforced the unionisation of telephonists, particularly in country exchanges. Hence the Branch's aggressive recruitment strategy, dependent on its shopfloor organisation and improved organisational resources, was crucial to its density growth in this period.

Discussion

This paper links the growth of the Telephonists' Union (Queensland Branch) to a range of institutional, structural, demographic, economic and attitudinal factors. Despite the conventional view that women are hard to organise, explanations of white-collar union growth commonly ascribe an important role to the increased workforce participation of women since the 1960s (Lansbury 1980; Dabsckeck and Niland 1981). For telephonist unionism, it was the increased employment of married women which was crucial to growth in the 1970s. The study points to conditions for the unionisation of these women. As Turbin (1992) wrote of the collar workers in America, family and social ties among telephonists were crucial to the development of collective consciousness and solidarity. The occupational structure of the
union may also have contributed to its successful recruitment of telephonists, as Cobble (1991) argues of the waitresses in America, but this is beyond the scope of the present study.

The Branch's recruitment strategy was also crucial to its growth in the 1970s. For the many telephonists and phonogramists who worked and lived in small, isolated and conservative country towns which had few employment opportunities for women, joining the union was a difficult step. In the absence of union preference provisions, for the Telephonists' Union to recruit these women, and those in the metropolitan centres who remained reluctant to join, required more than attitudinal changes and institutional supports. It required the Branch to actively court them.

The study provides some support for Schur and Kruse's (1992) suggestion that the nature of union organising drives is important to their success in unionising women workers. In their efforts to organise telephonists, the Queensland Branch officials visited small, remote country exchanges and encouraged autonomous shopfloor industrial action. They published a bi-monthly newsletter which had two major components: individual members' letters and contributions by officials which tried to persuade telephonists of the validity of industrial action, unionism and women's militancy. Such personalised communication may have been critical to the Branch's continued growth.

Contrary to Hancke's (1992) argument concerning the importance of shopfloor organisation to recruitment, the Branch's organising campaign between 1972 and 1973 contributed to unionisation, in the absence of a shopfloor structure. However, the recruitment campaign during the latter period when the Branch's density grew to almost saturation point hinged on the development of a formal shopfloor organisation. This arguably suggests that as a union reaches saturation point, strong shopfloor organisation may become more crucial to the success of a recruitment campaign. The study also contests Bain's (1970) argument that
union recruitment campaigns are effective only if the structural determinants of growth are favourable; that is, if money wages are rising, unemployment is low and government and employer attitudes are favourable. The dramatic increase in union density of Queensland's telephonists occurred in a context of rising unemployment and a perceived decline in wages relative to other groups.

The case of telephonist unionism suggests that the role of employment concentration in union growth is less significant than suggested by Bain (1970) and Hill (1982). Most of the Queensland Branch's growth occurred in a single year from July 1972 whereas the centralisation of telephonist employment into large automated exchanges occurred over several decades. The union density of telephonists continued to rise through the decade as the proportion of telephonists in small exchanges declined. Hence for those in expanding exchanges, employment concentration may have contributed to unionisation of metropolitan telephonists. However, telephonists in the small, remote exchanges proved no less unionisable in the 1970s than those in larger exchanges.

Conclusion

This paper challenges the orthodox conventions that union recruitment policies are not important to union growth in Australia and that women are hard to organise. The paper does not discount the importance of structural, institutional and economic factors to the growth of the Telephonists' Union (Queensland Branch). However, it argues that the Branch's recruitment strategy and the increased employment of married women as telephonists, together with pressing material concerns, were crucial to its increasing membership density in the 1970s. This supports recent American and British literature on the significance of union organising strategies and suggestions by Goldfield (1987), Peetz (1990) and others, that women are not necessarily less predisposed towards unionism than their male counterparts. The experience of the Telephonists' Union suggests that while recruitment strategy generally
may occupy little time among Australian union officials, it may nonetheless form a key part of their activity at particular historical moments. The paper also suggests the importance of micro-level studies in ascertaining the interplay of union growth determinants. Most of the international research on union growth has been based on statistical analysis. Hancke (1993: 595) recently asserted that: "at best, it seems, statistical analysis is helpful in filtering out relevant dimensions". To develop comparative explanations of union growth in Australia, more research is needed on the dynamic interaction of macro-determinants with the individual decision to unionise.
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